THEFT OF EMPLOYEE SERVICES UNDER THE
UNITED STATES PENAL CODE

In 1948 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 641 - a penal code section
designed to punish theft of money, property, and records of the
United States Government. In 1952 the Supreme Court construed
this section as a recodification of the various crimes againstfederal property that had previously existed in the Code. In 1959 the
Ninth Circuit refused to recognize theft of employee services as an
offense within the scope of section 641. Twenty-five years later the
Seventh Circuit disagreed, and construed the statute to protect
federal interests in employee services. This Comment illustrates
how general theft statutes, such as section 641, are traditionally
tied to legal concepts of property. The Comment notes that the
federal government possesses no property interest in the labor of
its employees. Therefore, this Comment recommends that courts
strictly construe section 641 and defer establishment of a federal
"theft of employee services" crime to Congress.
INTRODUCTION

Theft of property owned by the United States has been punishable
under federal law in various forms since 1790.1 Prior to 1948, the
United States Penal Code (Code) 2 sections dealing with larceny, embezzlement and related crimes were scattered in a confused manner
throughout the Code. The language used in this piecemeal legislation
lacked consistency. Consequently, the lines of demarcation between
these crimes against property were uncertain.3 In reality, the passage
of time had eroded the effective protection of property rights that the
1. See, e.g., I Stat. 116 (1790) (larceny on high seas); 2 Stat. 601 (1810) (larceny of newspapers from the mails); 9 Stat. 63 (1846) (embezzlement of public moneys;
failure to deposit); 14 Stat. 557 (1867) (larceny of property of United States).
2. The United States Penal Code is codified at 18 U.S.C.
3. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
July/August 1986 Vol. 23 No. 4

criminal law traditionally provided.4 Pleading difficulties and unjust
decisions were the symptoms of a Code desperately in need of
revision."
In 1948 Congress enacted section 641 6-- a major revision to the
Code which consolidated the scattered sections relating to larceny,
embezzlement, and false pretenses, within a single, general "theft"
section. 7 Although this revision was a major step toward improving
the Code, it failed to define "thing of value," 8 a phrase intended to
identify the subject matter of these crimes. Additionally, by inserting
the phrase, "converts to his use," the legislature introduced the tort
concept of conversion into the federal system of criminal law for the
first time.9 Although the legislature intended only to consolidate
crimes against property, the addition of conversion to the Code
brought with it enormous potential for expansion as well. 10
In 1952 the Supreme Court delivered its only opinion construing
section 641 in Morissette v. United States." In a comprehensive
analysis of the legislative history, the Court concluded that the conversion language did not create new crimes against property, but
rather, filled in gaps between the existing crimes. The Court concluded that the legislature was concerned with bringing to justice
those who "obtain wrongful advantages from another's property,"
yet who may not have technically committed larceny or embezzlement. 2 Despite its insight into the purposes underlying section 641,
the Morissette Court left many questions* unanswered, specifically,
13
the exact subject matter of the newly revised "theft" crime.
In 1959 the Ninth Circuit answered one such question in Chappell
4. See infra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
5. See Comment, Theft of Labor and Services, 12

STAN.

L. REv. 663 n.4

(1960).
6. Section 641 states
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use
of another . . . any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of. . ., or any
property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof- Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both ...
18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982).
7. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 272 (1952).
11. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
12. Id. at 271.
13. Morissette involved
a civilian deer hunter [who] was prosecuted under section 641 for knowingly
converting, to his own use, discarded simulated bombs he found while hunting
on United States Air Force property. The issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the government was required to prove the defendant's intent to convert
such property to his own use.
United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354, 1360 (7th Cir. 1984) (the issue of what may be
converted under section 641 did not arise in the case).
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v. United States:1 4 Does section 641 extend to protect the government's interest in the services of its employees? The Chappell court
held that employee services are not a "thing of value" and, therefore,
cannot be stolen or converted.15 The Chappell court, in dicta, confined application of section 641 to physical property. This decision
has been repeatedly criticized since 1959;11 however, the holding excluding employee services from section 641 remained unchallenged
until 1984.
In United States v. Croft,17 the Seventh Circuit rejected the
twenty-five year old Chappell holding. The Croft court, without reservation, held that employee services were properly the subject of
theft and conversion as things of value.:8 Employee services were
compared to many other forms of intangible property in which the
government has a financial interest. 19 Under Croft, arguably any in-

tangible interest of the government is protected by section 641.
In its present form, section 641 is susceptible to broad construction. Nevertheless, courts must balance the need to provide criminal
protection against policy considerations that demand strict construction of criminal statutes.2 0 Employee service, especially since the abolition of slavery, is a concept significantly different from that of personal property.2 ' Theft and conversion are, on the other hand,
historically tied to the law of property. 2 This Comment traces these
axioms through section 641 case law, from Chappell to the present,
taking issue with Croft and its overzealous disregard of these axioms. Radical changes in statutory construction should be avoided by
the courts. If section 641 is to apply to the services of government
employees, the decision, as a matter of judicial deference, belongs to
Congress.
ORIGINS AND INTENT OF SECTION

641

History of Theft
The modern law of theft is the product of centuries of case law
and legislation defining and redefining the nature of crimes against
14.

270 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959).

15. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
17. 750 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1984).
18. Id. at 1362.
19. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.

property. It represents the consolidation of common law larceny and
its statutory offspring. Developments in the criminal law of theft
23
have closely mirrored evolving concepts of property in civil law.
Larceny is generally defined as the intentional taking and carrying
away of another's personal property without consent.2 4 The common
law elements of this crime developed to protect a feudal society from
offenses against its most valuable possessions.25 Certain offenses,
however, became exempt from punishment under the law of larceny.
Generally, larceny applied only to movable property which could be
carried away. Interference with possession of land, or things firmly
26
attached to the land, was covered under the civil law of trespass.
Moreover, larceny did not apply when, at the time of the interference with the owner's interest, the offender was in legal possession of
the property. Finally, a fraudulent taking of another's property was
the notion that the owner had voluntarily parted
exempt, based upon
27
property.
the
with
Eighteenth century industrialization gave rise to new forms of
property and expanded needs in the protection of ownership interests. Faced with judicial hesitancy to expand larceny beyond its
traditional boundaries, legislatures enacted statutes that effectively
plugged the holes in common law larceny.28 Embezzlement statutes
were enacted to deal with offenses against an owner's property by
another in lawful possession of the property. 29 The element of fraud
gave rise to other crimes. If possession, but -not title, was obtained by
fraud, subsequent conversion was punishable under the crime of larceny by trick. 30 If title itself was obtained by fraud, the crime of
obtaining property by false pretenses was committed.31
It is noteworthy that the crimes of embezzlement and larceny by
trick include the element of conversion, although ordinary larceny
23. See generally J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1952).
24. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT. HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 622 (1972).
25. These possessions were generally limited to cattle, farming implements, and
harvested crops. "The local lord had a few chattels of relatively rare value, perhaps some
silver plate, several gold ornaments, his weapons, horses and dogs." Cattle, however, as a
mode of transportation and a medium of exchange, "were by far the most important of
the possessions." J. HALL, supra note 23, at 81-82.

26.

See id. at 83-84.

27.

See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 622-23.

28. A comprehensive discussion of the limitations in the common law of larceny
and the 18th century legislative responses can be found in J. HALL, supra note 23, at 3479.
29. A common example of embezzlement is when a bailee absconds with the
bailed property rather than return it to the bailor as agreed. Although the bailee had
legal possession of the property, failure to return it constitutes a material interference

with the bailor's ownership interest-a conversion. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra
note 24, at 644-54.
30. See id. at 627.
31. See Id. at 655-72.
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and false pretenses do not.32 Conversion, an intentional civil law tort,
includes "those major interferences with the chattel, or with the
plaintiff's rights in it, which are so serious, and so important, as to
justify the forced judicial sale to the defendant . . . -33 Conversion
may involve removing, transferring possession of, withholding possession of, destroying, altering, or misusing the chattel.3 4 "Conversion
for embezzlement purposes is not different from conversion for tort
' 35

purposes.
Industrialized society gave rise to the concept of intangible prop-

erty. Choses in action were the primary intangible property rights
created in the course of business transactions.3 6 As a general rule,

however, courts did not recognize criminal offenses against such intangible rights.3 7 Larceny, and related crimes, generally applied to
movable goods only. The chose was considered to merge into the
rights that it represented; because the right was not a movable good,
38
the chose in action could not be stolen.

In addition to the problems involving intangibles, prosecutions in-

volving offenses against property became increasingly confusing.

This led to unjust results. Larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses did not overlap; they were very distinct crimes which became

cumbersome when applied to complex fact patterns. Prosecutors
might prove a crime that was not pleaded, or perhaps, might plead

all of the property-related crimes yet fail to prove any one of them
completely. Many offenders escaped conviction or had convictions

reversed.39

Many American states revised and consolidated their penal codes

during the twentieth century. The new crime of "theft" emerged,
utilizing the elements of larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement,

and false pretenses. 40 These theft statutes were intended to eliminate
32.
33.

See id. at 645.
W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 90 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
34. See id. at 95-102.
35. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 24, at 645.
36. A chose is defined as "[a] thing; an article of personal property. A chose...
is either in action or in possession." A chose in action is defined as "[a] right to personal
things of which the owner has not the possession, but merely a right of action for their
possession ....
A right to receive or recover a debt, demand, or damages [in contract
or tort causes of action]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 125 (5th ed. 1983).
37. See J. HALL, supra note 23, at 85-88.
38. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 24, at 633.
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 97 Mass. 584 (1867); Nichols v. People, 17 N.Y. 114 (1858); see also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 24, at 673-76.
40. Some statutes retain the traditional terminology, but consolidate the various

many pleading problems and convict offenders who were otherwise
avoiding conviction under the previous inadequate criminal stat-

utes. 41 The language within these theft statutes broadly defines those
property interests protected. However, legislatures tended to specifi-

cally enumerate those unconventional forms of protected personal
property. Choses in action were usually protected in this manner."2
As society grows more complex, new forms of intangible property
are continually identified. Issues arise concerning theft or conversion
of ideas, information, images, computer time, and even clientele.
Prosser & Keeton found no reason why conversion (and, therefore,
embezzlement and larceny by trick) should not expand to include
"any species of personal property which is the subject of private
ownership.

'43

1948-Revision of the Code
Prior to 1948, Congress had codified crimes against United States
property without regard to the interrelationships among the various

Code sections it enacted. As in many states, this situation was the
result of defensive legislation intended to resolve many shortcomings
which arose in the law of larceny. 44 These overlapping sections led to
confusion in pleadings and inconsistency in results.45 In response, the
were consolidated by Congress in 1948 to form secvarious sections
4
tion 641 .
The former Code sections failed to protect the government from a
wide range of offenses committed against its property. Larceny and
embezzlement were well covered in the pre-1948 Code,47 yet serious
crimes against property under one code section. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §
30 (West 1970) ("Whoever steals, or. . . obtains by a false pretense, or. . . with intent
to steal or embezzle, converts . . . the property of another . . . shall be guilty of larceny . . . ."). Other statutes avoid the traditional terminology in favor of the more general "theft." E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (West 1964) ("whoever does any of the
following commits theft ... ").

See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 24, at 677.
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30 (West 1970) ("the term 'property,' as used in this section, shall include money, personal chattels, a bank note, bond,
promissory note, .... a deed or writing containing a conveyance of land, any valuable
41.

42.

contract in force ..

").

43. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 92 (citing Vaughn v. Wright, 139 Ga.
736, 78 S.E. 123 (1913)).
44. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
45. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982). See supra note 6.
47. Larceny was included in four sections of the pre-1948 Code. 18 U.S.C. § 82
(1940) read, "[w]hoever shall take and carry away or take for his use. . . with intent to
steal or purloin . . .

."

18 U.S.C. § 87 (1940) read, "[w]hoever shall steal . . . or know-

ingly apply to his own use, or unlawfully sell, convey, or dispose of. . .

."

(1940) read, "[w]hoever shall . . . feloniously take and carry away .

...

18 U.S.C. § 99
" Finally, 18

Embezzlement
U.S.C. § 100 (1940) read, "[w]hoever shall . . . steal, or purloin ....
was included in 18 U.S.C, § 82 (1940) ("embezzling arms and stores"), and in 18 U.S.C.
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interference with government property could still pass unpunished. 48
Offenses such as alteration, obstruction, or misuse usually do not involve an intent to permanently deprive owners of property rights.
This was an essential element of larceny and embezzlement. 49 Only
a strained construction of the former Code sections could possibly
encompass these offenses.
By consolidating five former sections,50 Congress eliminated redundancy. 5' Congress sifted through the former Code, extracting a
cross-section of language. The word "property," present in each of
the former sections, now appears in the title of section 641--"Public
money, property, or records." The body of section 641 reads in part,
"any record, voucher, money, or thing of value ... "52 This
method of enumeration highlights records, vouchers, and money as
property sufficiently unique to require independent treatment.
"Thing of value,"'5 3 on the other hand, seems to correspond to the

word "property" in the title of section 641, constituting
a catch-all
54
category for the government's less unique possessions.
The only new section 641 language is: "knowingly converts to his
own use." 55 By introducing this tort concept of conversion into the
new Code section, the scope of the new section was expanded significantly.5 61 The extent of this expansion was identified by Justice Jack57
son in the Supreme Court's scrutiny of section 641 in Morissette.
§ 100 (1940) ("embezzling public moneys or other property").
48. See infra note 57.
49. See Comment, supra note 5, at 666.
50. The revisers' note to section 641 states that section 641 is a consolidation of
U.S.C. §§ 82, 87, 100, and 101 (1940). There is no mention of section 99 being part of
that consolidation. The Supreme Court in Morissette, however, concluded that section 99
must also have been incorporated into section 641. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 266-69
n.28.
51. "We find no other purpose in the 1948 re-enactment than to collect from
scattered sources crimes so kindred as to belong in one category." See Morissette, 342
U.S. at 266-67.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982). See supra note 6.
53. Although the phrase "any thing of value" did not actually appear in the predecessors of section 641, the phrase, "valuable thing whatever," did appear in predecessor
section 18 U.S.C. § 100 (1940).
54. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 24, at 77.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982). See supra note 6.
56. The prior Code sections did contain language similar to "converts to his use."
See 18 U.S.C. § 82 (1940) ("take for his own use"); 18 U.S.C. § 87 (1940) ("apply to his
own use").
57. The history of § 641 demonstrates that it was [intended] to apply to acts
which constituted larceny or embezzlement at common law and also acts which
shade into those crimes but which, most strictly considered, might not be found
to fit their fixed definitions . . . .The 1948 Revision was not intended to create

Morissette emphasizes three fundamental themes. First, the crime
of theft under section 641 is synonymous with obtaining "wrongful
advantage from another's property." 58 Second, the revision of section
641 did not create new crimes, but merely clarified and refined those
already in existence; the language included by Congress maintained
its traditional meaning." Third, the Court's continuous use of the
word "property" indicates that Congress was concerned with protecting only property interests in the tradition of larceny, embezzlement
and related crimes. 60 Protecting a nonproperty interest under section
641 would create a new crime, thus directly conflicting with

Morissette.
In 1959 the government attempted to expand section 641 to pro-

tect its financial interest in the services of one of its employees. In
Chappell v. United States,6 however, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
government's claim and refused to expand section 641 to include services. This issue was not directly addressed again for twenty-five
years.62 Finally, in 1984, the Seventh Circuit flatly rejected Chappell

new crimes but to recodify those then in existence ....
342 U.S. at 269 n.28.
It is not surprising if there is considerable overlapping in the embezzlement,
stealing, purloining and knowing conversion grouped in this statute. What has
concerned codifiers of the larceny-type offense is that gaps or crevices have
separated particular crimes of this general class and guilty men have escaped
through the breaches. The books contain a surfeit of cases drawing fine distinctions between slightly different circumstances under which one may obtain
wrongful advantages from another's property. The codifiers wanted to reach all
such instances. Probably every stealing is a conversion, but certainly not every
knowing conversion is a stealing ....
Id. at 271.
Conversion may include misuse or abuse of property. It may reach use in an
unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent of property placed in one's
custody for limited use . . . . It is not difficult to think of intentional and
knowing abuses and unauthorized uses of government property that might be
knowing conversions but which could not be reached as embezzlement, stealing
or purloining. Knowing conversion adds significantly to the range of protection
of government property ....
Id. at 272.
58. See supra note 57.
59. "And where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from
which it was taken . . . ." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.
60. Throughout the Morissette opinion, the Court uses the word "property" each
time it refers to the subject matter of theft or conversion. E.g., 342 U.S. at 270-71 ("But
knowing conversion requires more than knowledge that defendant was taking the property into his possession."); id. at 272 ("[K]nowing conversion adds significantly to the
range of protection of government property."). See supra note 57.
61. 270 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959).
62. The dicta in Chappell that refuses to expand section 641 to include any intangible, has been frequently rejected by courts since 1959. See notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
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in United States v. Croft,6 3 holding that government employee services were protected interests under section 641. e The Croft decision
created a conflict at the circuit court level. Further, it contradicted
the Supreme Court's comprehensive analysis in Morissette.5
CASES IN CONFLICT

1959-The Chappell Decision

The defendant in Chappell v. United States 6 was a Master Sergeant in the Air Force who allegedly converted the services of an
Airman under his supervision. The Sergeant was convicted of knowingly converting to his own use and benefit the services of the Airman, "such services . . . being a thing of value belonging to the
United States .... ,,67 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the indictment failed to state a violation of section 641. 1

Three themes emerge from the Chappell decision. First, services
are intangibles, and as such fall outside the ordinary scope of theft.

Secondly, in redrafting the Code in 1948, Congress did not intend to
expand the scope of crimes against property. Finally, as a criminal

statute, section 641 should be narrowly construed.
After quoting Blackstone, who defines larceny as extending only to
personal goods,69 the court concluded that intangibles of any sort
have no place in the ordinary construction of theft: "At common law,
personal property in order to be [the subject of] larceny must be
corporeal or tangible. '70 The court failed to explore why theft could
63. 750 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1984).
64. Id. at 1362.
65. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
66. 270 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959).
67. The Sergeant owned several apartments in Mountain View, Alaska. Both the
Sergeant and the Airman were assigned to Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska. During
a three-week period in 1956, the Sergeant put the Airman on sick call so that the Airman would receive his pay while remaining absent from his normal duties. The Airman
was not sick; rather, he spent his normal duty hours painting the interiors of the Sergeant's apartments. It was uncertain whether the Airman was an accomplice of the Sergeant, but nonetheless, the Sergeant was in a position of authority. See id. at 275-76.
68. The court held that such failure "constitutes plain error within the meaning
of Rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C.," and the court never addressed the assignments of error raised
in the appeal. Chappell, 270 F.2d at 276.
69. "Larceny is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of

another." Chappell, 270 F.2d at 277. The court also quoted

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1070 (3d ed. 1933) to define conversion as "an unauthorized assumption and exercise of
the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights." Id. at 277.
70. Id. at 277, (quoting 2 W. BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME § 503 (1946)). Additionally, "[a]ny tangible chattel may be the subject of conversion .... Intangible prop-

905

not extend to any form of property, tangible or intangible. It simply
viewed the common-law definition of theft as an unyielding rule of
law. From that perspective, the intangible right to employee services
could never fall within the scope of ordinary theft statutes.
The government's case required that section 641 be characterized
as an appropriate expansion of the law of theft. Relying primarily on
Morissette, the court was not convinced that such expansion had occurred. 71 In Morissette the court had ruled that section 641 consolidated and strengthened the existing crimes against property but did
not create new crimes. 72 The purpose of theft and conversion law,
therefore, was no different after 1948 than it was previously-the
protection of tangible personal property rights from interference. 73
The court considered the expansion of section 641 to include intangibles a "revolutionary concept." It then iterated the rule of strict
construction which applies to all criminal statutes: "[Criminal statutes] must be strictly construed. [They] cannot be enlarged by analogy or expanded beyond the plain meaning of the words used."174 The
indictment for theft of services under section 641 was, therefore, defective and the Sergeant's conviction was reversed.
Only four years before Chappell, the Sixth Circuit, in Burnett v.
United States,75 affirmed a theft of services conviction. That case
had a strikingly similar fact pattern.7 6 The issue of whether section
641 applied to services, however, was never raised, and never addressed by the court. 7 The Ninth Circuit expressly disagreed with
the Burnett holding and anything it may have implied.78
Thus, Chappell prevailed as the leading decision expressly defining
the subject matter of theft and conversion under section 641. Over
the next twenty-five years many courts, construing section 641,
reached conflicting and often uncertain results.7 9 However, not until
erty relations may not be converted except in [certain limited situations]." Id. at 277 n.6,
(quoting I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.13 (1956)).
71. "We cannot believe that in importing the new words 'knowingly converts'
Congress meant that the subject of the conversion should be of any different type than
the subject of larceny or that it could be other than personal goods." Chappell, 270 F.2d
at 277.
72. See supra note 57.
73. See supra notes 69 & 70 and accompanying text.
74. Chappell, 270 F.2d at 278.
75. 222 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1955)(per curiam).
76. Burnett involved a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army, convicted of "knowingly
convert[ing] to his own use the services and labor of two employees of the United States
in constructing a chest of drawers for his personal use and benefit, without reimbursing
the United States for the value of such services and labor." Id. at 427.
77. The defendant's appeal, alleged error regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
and the admissibility of certain evidence. The defendant did not allege that the indictment under section 641, for the conversion of services, failed to state an offense. Id.
78. Chappell, 270 F.2d at 278.
79. See infra notes 99-124.
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the Seventh Circuit's 1984 decision in Croft did a direct conflict with
the Chappell holding arise.
1984-The Croft Decision
In United States v. Croft,8" the defendant was a university professor convicted of converting the services of a research assistant paid
with government funds."" The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District
Court conviction, rejecting the Professor's claim that the services of
the Assistant were not a "thing of value" under section 641.82 The
court never questioned that employee services are a thing of value to
an employer.8 3 The only issue addressed was whether intangible
things of value, such as services, fall within the scope of section 641.
The court discussed the expansion of crimes against property
under section 641. In Chappell, expansion was confined to conduct;
Congress' addition of conversion to the Code expanded upon the
court's power to punish criminal conduct peculiar to the law of conversion. 4 The Croft court's expansion, however, focused upon new
forms of subject matter, namely intangible property. Under the
court's construction of the phrase "thing of value" in section 641,
theft and conversion shed the historical limitations which required
tangibility. Misuse of intangible property was now considered one of
80. 750 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1984).
81. The defendant was an Assistant Professor of Veterinary Sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) agreed to
sponsor an asbestos research study coordinated by the Professor. The EPA designated the
University as custodian of approximately $130,000 earmarked for expenses of the EPA
project. Shortly thereafter, the Professor became involved in an unrelated and personal
asbestos research project with the Town of Weston, Wisconsin. He was paid approximately $40,000 to conduct the project, and in 1981 the Professor employed one particular student to assist him. Having devoted no research time to the EPA project, this Assistant was nevertheless paid with EPA funds. Although the Professor did not have custody
of the EPA funds, he was in a position to control disbursements. See id. at 1355-59,
1361.
82. Because the Professor stood in such a position of control over the disbursement of the EPA funds, it would seem that he should have been convicted of converting
the funds, rather than the services. The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue as follows:
According to the conditions set forth in the EPA agreement and the regulations enumerated in 40 C.F.R. § 30.100 et seq, the EPA ... maintains substantial supervision and control over the funds in that account. Thus, for purposes of our analysis, the EPA paid for [the Assistant's] services.
Croft, 750 F.2d at 1361 n.4.
83. In a matter of fact manner, the court stated: "[i]n the present case, Croft
improperly converted to his own use a 'thing of value,' specifically the services of [the
Assistant]." Id. at 1361. See infra note 124.
84. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.

those acts that, under Morissette, would "shade into" conversion."6
The Croft court found support in a number of earlier federal court
decisions interpreting section 641 to include various forms of intangible property.86 These decisions uniformly characterize the "tangibility" requirement in Chappell as a "narrow and unrealistic interpretation" 87 of section 641. The Croft court exploited the momentum
created by these earlier cases.
The Croft court rebutted the warning found in Chappell regarding
strict construction. Quoting Justice Holmes, the Seventh Circuit
countered, "[w]e agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."88 Although the language of section 641 does not include the word "intangible," the Croft court held that it was included within the obvious meaning of the Code section taken as a
whole. The merging of "conversion" with the phrase "thing of
value," was seen as an ample substitution for this omission.8 9 Based
upon this line of reasoning, Chappell was discarded as precedent.
While neither Croft, nor Chappell, is the definitive statement on intangible "things of value," the Chappell holding is preferred. 90
DEFINING THE LIMITS OF

SECTION

641

Strict Construction of Criminal Statutes
The Chappell and Croft courts focused on the proper construction
of section 641. In each case, the court reviewed the legislative history and the Morissette analysis of that history. The courts dissected
the language of the Code section attempting to determine the ordinary meaning of the operative words, mindful of the policy requiring
strict construction of criminal statutes.91 The conflicting results can
be attributed to the discretion involved in applying that policy.
Strict construction serves primarily as a protective device. Severe
penalties often accompany criminal statutes. Accordingly, ambigu85. Croft, 750 F.2d at 1361.
86. The court discusses the following cases: United States v. May, 625 F.2d 186
(8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976). See Croft, 750 F.2d at 1360-61. See infra notes
102-117 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of these and other important section 641 cases.
87. Croft, 750 F.2d at 1362.
88. Id. at 1362 (citing Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929)).
89. The Croft court stated that "the statutory words 'thing of value,' broaden the
scope of section 641 beyond the subject matter of the common law torts which are its
foundation." Croft, 750 F.2d at 1360.
90. Both opinions ignore the property/services distinction. See infra notes 127-44
and accompanying text.
91. See Chappell, 270 F.2d at 278; see also Croft, 750 F.2d at 1362.
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ous or unclear language should be construed in favor of the defendant. A person should not be executed, imprisoned, or heavily fined
for violating
a statute that does not clearly embrace the committed
92
offense.

Criminal statues should not be expansively interpreted simply to
reach offensive behavior that would otherwise go unpunished. To do
so ignores the notice function of criminal statutes. When the legislature enacts a statute, it does so prospectively. Once the statute becomes law, it is assumed to be made known to everyone in that jurisdiction. "Criminals should be given fair warning, before they engage
in a course of c6nduct, as to what conduct is punishable and how
severe the punishment is."s Although individuals may never have
actual knowledge of a statute, they are deemed to have constructive
knowledge.
When a court applies a statute, it does so retrospectively. Because
the defendant has already acted, nothing that the court says at trial
will provide notice or guidance for that particular defendant. An extraordinary reading of the statute after the fact can be devastating.
Just as legislatures are prohibited from enacting ex post facto
laws, 94 courts should refrain from giving valid laws a similarly expansive effect.
If the statute does not clearly and reasonably include certain conduct, courts should not fill the void. 95 Judicial restraint may admittedly yield undesirable results, especially in the federal system which
does not recognize common-law crimes.9 Certain defendants may be
familiar with the text of criminal statutes, and may conduct themselves to avoid any potential violation. Justice may dictate that such
clever use of the statutes should be punished. However, due process
is constitutionally required, often overriding the court's desire to do
"justice."
The policy considerations that support judicial conservatism
should not, however, completely stifle the court's discretion.
"[T]hough penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be
construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legisla92. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT supra note 24, at 72.
93. Id.
94. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 9, cl. 3, 10, cl. 1.
95. "The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to
create new crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components
contemplated by the words used in the statute." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.
96. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 24, at 60.

ture.' 97 Such legislative intent may be identified in the statutory language and the legislative history. Legislative history, however, should
not in itself be determinative. The legislative history should be used
only to cast a brighter light on the actual text of the statute.98
Giving statutory language its obvious meaning must be the primary concern of any court applying criminal statutes to unique situations. Courts should not blindly follow an expansionary trend without fully analyzing the grounds for such expansion. Similarly, courts
should not allow their sense of justice to intrude upon the overriding
policies which may weigh against expansive statutory interpretation.
Rather, courts should strive to extract from the statute the true
scope of its applicability.
Expansion Into Intangibles
The Chappell court's refusal to expand section 641 to intangible
property was extremely conservative. Historically, crimes against
property did not apply to intangible property, however, there is no
clear reason why they should not. The operative concept is property
rather than its tangibility. So long as an exclusive property right
clearly exists, it would not be extraordinary to expand the protection
of a general theft section (such as section 641) to intangible
property. 9
Conversion of intangible property may arise in two distinct situations. In the first case, interference is with some tangible object that
embodies the more valuable intangible property interest. 00 In the
second case, interference does not involve a tangible object, but directly involves an intangible property interest. 10 ' Historically, as the
interference becomes more removed from tangibility, courts have
97.

(1820)).

Id. at 72 (quoting Marshall, C.J. in United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76

No doubt some criminal statutes deserve a stricter construction than others.
Other things being equal, felony statutes should be construed more strictly

than misdemeanor statutes; those with severe punishments more than those
with lighter penalties; those involving morally bad conduct more than those
involving conduct not so bad; those involving conduct with drastic public consequences more than those whose consequences to the public are less terrible;
those carelessly drafted more than those done carefully.
Id.at 73. Section 641 is a felony statute that carries with it a potential sentence of ten
years imprisonment. See supra note 6.
98. See W. LA

FAVE

& A. ScOTT, supra note 24, at 72.

99. See supra text accompanying note 43.
100. For example, if a theft involves a bond that entitles the bearer to receive a
stated amount, the thief has stolen the intangible right to receive payment by stealing the
tangible bond certificate.
101. For example, a "theft" could involve use of a counterfeit bond certificate. The
thief has stolen the intangible right to receive payment by presenting a counterfeit bearer
bond certificate to the issuer. The thief has not interfered with the victim's possession of
the genuine certificate, however, the value of that certificate has been materially affected.

910
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been less willing to expand section 641.102

The most controversial section 641 cases have involved confidential information contained in government agency files. The unautho-

rized taking and carrying away of original documents from agency
files clearly violates section 641;103 the government is completely de-

prived of its ownership interest in the information contained in the

04
documents. This information is often of great value.1

When the document is photocopied and replaced, rather than permanently removed, the "tangibility"

connection becomes more

strained. In United States v. DiGilio,0 5 the Third Circuit concluded

that duplicate copies are still records of the United States, and unau-

thorized removal of copied FBI files violates section 641. In DiGilio,
the photocopying was performed on government equipment using
government supplies. 06 This was ultimately an important factor in

the case. Three years later, in 1979, the DiGilio rationale was fol-

10 7 a case with similar facts. In
lowed in United States v. Hubbard,

the same year, the Second Circuit upheld the expansion of section
0 8 a case involving the unauthorized
641 in United States v. Girard,2
removal of information from a computer file at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In Girard,the information was printed
by the DEA computer system and removed from the office by an
employee.

09

Most courts apply section 641 when confidential infor-

mation is reproduced on tangible government property." 0O

102. See, e.g., United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1979).
103. Theft of a record of the United States is specifically provided for in section
641. See supra note 6.
104. Once the prosecution has proved its case of theft of the tangible document,
valuation would be the only remaining issue. For an example of a valuation problem in a
section 641 case unrelated to theft of information, see United States v. May, 625 F.2d
186 (8th Cir. 1980).
105. 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976).
106. An FBI clerk-typist copied the original documents related to an investigation
of the defendant, "during her working hours and with government papers and copying
equipment. The original records were returned ... to the proper files." The clerk-typist
then removed the copies from the office. The defendant eventually received the copies
through a series of middlemen. These activities were conducted frequently over approximately a six-month period. Id. at 976.
107. 474 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1979). "[T]he defendants removed originals of government documents and made photocopies of them through the use of government equipment and government supplies, and then returned the original to the agency." Id. at 79.
The court held that "copies made from government resources are owned by the government." Id. at 80.
108. 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1979).
109. See id. at 70.
110. Unlike DiGilioand Hubbard,the Girardcourt did not expressly rest its deci-

When a defendant "borrows" a document from an agency's files
and reproduces it by private means, the defendant has stolen neither
the document nor any other government property in the process."1
There has been a misuse, yet its significance must be established;
only a serious misuse constitutes conversion." 2 A similar situation
arose under section 641 in the "Pentagon Papers Trial." 113
Perhaps the most tenuous expansion of section 641 in "theft of
information" cases involves absolutely no tangible interference. A
defendant may memorize information while in legal possession of a
government document. A defendant may use an idea obtained from
a government source."14 Such cases raise the ultimate question: Can
information itself be stolen or 5converted? To date, no court has expanded section 641 that far."
It is questionable whether information and ideas may be subject to
exclusive property rights. Constitutional protections of free speech
and press weigh heavily against such a concept." 6 In United States
v. Hubbard, the Court stated, "[i]f section 641 reaches the theft of
sion on the narrow, tangible aspects of the offense. The court considered the information
itself capable of section 641 protection. However, due to the factual similarity of Girard
to the more narrow holdings, it is doubtful that the opinion will carry much precedential
weight. See, e.g., United States v. Truoung Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
The courts have preferred the narrower holding. In fact, the DiGiliocourt held that "[a]
duplicate copy is a record for purposes of [section 641]. . . ." 538 F.2d at 977. Theft of
a government record is specifically provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 641. See supra note 6.
11I.
One of the fundamental elements of larceny is "an intent to deprive the owner
of the possession of his property permanently or for an unreasonable length of time, or to
use the property in such a way that the owners will probably be deprived of it." W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 24, at 637.
112. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 90; see also Hubbard, 474 F.
Supp. at 79 (citing Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). "[T]he court
of appeals for this circuit ruled that the temporary removal of documents for copying
purposes does not result in a tortious conversion." Additionally, the court states, "there is
clear precedent that the copying of any document does not constitute conversion." Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. at 80.
113. See United States v. Russo, No. 9373-(WMB)-CD (filed Dec. 29, 1971), dismissed (C.D. Cal. May I1, 1973) (the case against Daniel Ellsberg, not to be confused
with the case against the New York Times (New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971)). In Russo, Ellsberg was in rightful possession of the "Pentagon Papers." He had them copied at a private copy shop. These copies later came into the
possession of the New York Times and Washington Post. Ellsberg and Russo were
charged inter alia with violating section 641. This celebrated case was dismissed on other
grounds, however, and the section 641 issue was never decided. For an excellent analysis
of the proceedings see Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues
Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1974).
114. See generally Moskoff, The Theft of Thoughts: The Realities of 1984, 27
CRIM. LAW Q. 226 (1984-85).
115. Although in Girard, the court held that the information itself may be converted, that case involved many tangible considerations. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. There have been no such holdings in cases involving ideas, memorization of information, or photocopying with nongovernmental resources. See United States
v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985).
116. See, e.g., Pearson, 410 F.2d at 707-08; Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. at 80; Nimmer, supra note 113, at 319-20.
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government information, ... serious first amendment questions
would be raised, and there is ample legal authority to avoid these
constitutional questions by interpreting the statute to not include information as a thing of value."' 117
The 1959 Chappell decision illustrated that section 641 is not a
cure-all for every offense against valuable government interests. Certain interests were considered so foreign to theft law that broad statutory language would not include them. Often, more specific language is necessary to adequately notify the public. 118 The Chappell
court treated employee services, and all intangibles, in this manner,
drawing the line at tangibility. 1 9
Subsequent courts, however, disagree with the Chappell tangibility distinction. Certain intangible interests seem less alien to theft
than others. 20 In those cases, courts extended the limits of section
641, gradually drawing a new line that excluded situations involving
tenuous or nonexistent ownership interests. Constitutional or practical problems may also have influenced these new limits of section
641.121

The Croft court, in contrast, concluded that section 641 was so
broadly worded that no limit should be put on its expansion. The
court produced a revolutionary construction of theft, and of section
641, discarding the concept of property completely. 2 2 Theft of em117. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. at 79.
118. More specific theft statutes exist at the state level. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 484 (West 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 16 (West 1977). These statutes have
been worded to specifically include certain types of behavior and subject matter. However, section 641 is still capable of a reasonably broad construction. See Truong Dinh
Hung, 629 F. 2d at 924.
119. Chappell, 270 F.2d at 277-78.
120. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
121. Section 641 could interfere with, or even defeat, the purpose for existing federal sanctions for the disclosure of classified information:
Congress has legislated frequently and with precision with regard to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and it has chosen to punish only
certain categories of disclosures and defendants .... If § 641 were extended

to penalize the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, it would
greatly alter this meticulously woven fabric of criminal sanctions.
Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 926.
A similar situation could arise with regard to federal copyright legislation. "The right
to prevent or control the making of copies of material contained in a document is known
as copyright." Nimmer, supra note 113, at 319. "[T]he Congress has explicitly provided
that there is no copyright on government documents. 17 U.S.C. § 105." Hubbard,474 F.
Supp. at 80. Additionally, if all government documents can be protected under section
641, the statute may well be found overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional. See
Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 924-25; Nimmer, supra note 113, at 322.
122. The court did not believe it had judicially extended theft beyond property

ployee services-interference with an intangible in which no property right is recognized-is a fundamentally new concept. 2 3 Thus,
the Croft court created a new crime, in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative intent. 24 Section 641
is an ordinary theft statute; the property requirement must, there-

fore, be maintained . 25 Property can be owned; employee services
cannot. This distinction is controlling.
The Property/ServicesDistinction

Judge Dumbauld's concurring opinion in Croft raises an interesting point. He stated: "services are not property, at least since the
13th amendment abolished slavery . .

.

. [C]onversion of services

may constitute misconduct, wrongful activity, or breach of obligation, but [a service is] not property. You cannot make it property 'by
calling it a thing.' ,126 This sharp distinction between property and
services should not be discarded in the construction of theft statutes

unless expressly intended by the legislature.
The thirteenth amendment constitutionalized the belief that one

person could not own the services of another. 12 7 The one-time slave
owner became an employer, the slave an employee, and the property
interest an interest in an employment contract. So long as theft remains tied to property principles, it cannot include employee serprinciples. The court considered such extension to have been performed by Congress in
1948. The phrase "thing of value" was seen as including more than just property interests. As a result, the court seems to have been puzzled by the charge in the concurring
opinion that the court was considering services as property. The court countered, "our
narrow holding is that the services [of the Assistant] do constitute a 'thing of value'
under 18 US.C. § 641." Croft, 750 F.2d at 1362 n.5.
123. "[Theft of Services] represented a substantially new concept in New York
law when it was incorporated into the revised penal Law in 1967. Because of its basic
novelty as a separate defined crime, no attempt was then made to further subclassify it;
- . the Legislature would impose reasonable subclassifications." N.Y. PENAL LAW §
165.15 (McKinney 1975) (practice commentary).
124. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). See supra note 57.
125. "[T]he existence of rare cases which cannot be fitted into any accepted classification is the inevitable limitation of any law. . . ." J.HALL, supra note 23, at 108-09.
The accepted classification when discussing theft or conversion is property. For Hall, the
problem in extending theft to intangible rights is fitting them into the definition of property in the private law. He refers to International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 239 (1918), in which the Supreme Court struggled with this problem. J.HALL,
supra note 23, at 107-08.
126. Croft, 750 F.2d at 1367-68. Judge Dumbauld did not dissent from the majority opinion. Although he found that opinion fundamentally flawed, he was unwilling to
differ with what he considered strong precedent. He was referring to United States v.
Bailey, 734 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1984). Bailey, however, is not strong precedent. First, the
case involves the embezzlement of public funds, not services. Second, the court, similar to
the Supreme Court in Morissette, constantly uses the word property in its analysis of
section 641. In reality, Judge Dumbauld struck on the key note of the Chappell and
Croft cases and should have pursued it more vigorously.
127. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII.
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vices. However, the thirteenth amendment restriction is overcome
simply by redefining theft, or in a sense, by creating a new crime.
Once theft is stripped of its property ties and redefined to specifically
include services, convictions in cases such as Chappell and Croft
would be acceptable. 12 8 However, such an overhaul 129
of a criminal
the province of Congress.

statute is exclusively within
Several states have recognized the inadequacy of traditional theft
law for protecting employment relationships.1 30 Feeling a need to design criminal sanctions for those who intentionally misappropriate
employee services, states began to revise their theft codes.1 31 Effec-

tive revision was accomplished in one of two ways. Some states, like
California, merely added the words, "labor," and "services," into
their existing theft sections.' 32 Other states, including New York and
Illinois, created entire sections concerned solely with the intricacies

of employee service theft. 133

128. Croft was not a decision that violated the thirteenth amendment. Judge
Dumbauld referred to the thirteenth amendment to illustrate the fundamental differences
between property ownership and employment relationships.
129. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
130. See J. HALL, supra note 23, at 104-07, discussing the application of the old
NEW YORK PENAL CODE § 1290 in People v. Ashworth, 220 A.D. 498, 222 N.Y.S. 24
(1927):
In People v. Ashworth, an important New York case, one defendant was the
mill superintendent and general manager of the A.O. Worsted Co. Inc. His
brother, also a defendant, was the owner of a company which had a contract to
comb twenty thousand pounds of raw wool and to spin this wool at twenty
cents a pound. Having no facilities for spinning the wool, he arranged with the
mill superintendent to have the spinning done at the Worsted Co. Without the
knowledge of this company, its machinery, facilities and laborers were used.
When the facts were discovered the brothers and three other persons were indicted for conspiracy and grand larceny. They were convicted, but on appeal
the judgment was reversed by a unanimous court.
131. The state code revisions that created the theft of services crime were generally separate from, and subsequent to, the state code revisions that consolidated the theft
crimes into the single crime of theft. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
132. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West 1970). This statute was revised in 1927
to include labor for the first time, seemingly in reaction to the Ashworth decision in New
York. See supra note 130; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812-012 (West Supp. 1986);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802-02 (1978).
133. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 1975). Section 165.15 was
amended in 1975 to include subsection (7):
Section 165.15 Theft of Services
A person is guilty of theft of services when:
7. Obtaining or having control over labor in the employ of another person, .
knowing that he is not entitled to the use thereof, and with intent to derive a
commercial or other substantial benefit for himself or a third person, he uses or
diverts to the use of himself or a third person such labor . . ..
The practice commentary to subsection 7 states that the amendment was directed at the

According to the commentary following the New York code section, theft of services was not an ordinary expansion of theft. "Since
'services' are not 'property,' 'theft' of a service does not constitute
larceny; and, if any such conduct is to be proscribed, it must be by
special statute." 1 34 This statement is historically accurate. A property right cannot be claimed in employee services, except perhaps by
the employee who provides them. 13 5 Absent a property interest, there
can be no theft without altering the essence of that crime. The same
is true of conversion. Prosser & Keeton, who recognized the virtually
limitless 13
potential for expansion, drew the line at private
ownership. 6
Perhaps an argument in favor of expansion without statutory revision can be borrowed from civil law. The tort of interference with
contractual relations recognizes that an employer may have a valuable interest in an employment contract. This interest embodies the
13 7
employer's right to the exclusive benefit of the employee's services.
If the employer does indeed have a property interest in this right, it
could conceivably be interfered with in such a manner as to constitute a conversion.
An argument of this sort is unacceptable, however, since
"[s]ervices are thought to be the property of the one rendering them,
and it is clear that no property interest in the services is conveyed by a contract with the party to whom they are rendered. 13 8
The lack of a perfected property interest in employment relationships discourages courts from granting specific performance remedies in employment contract disputes. 139 Courts are also concerned
about imposing a personal servitude on an employee. Such tenuous,
revolutionary arguments should40 not be relied upon to broaden the
scope of any criminal statute.
The distinction between property and services is fundamental to
an ordinary construction of a broad theft statute such as section 641.
Only by specific statutory language has theft been construed to in-

Ashworth holding. See supra note 130; see also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-3 (West
1977) (enacted in 1961).
134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(7) (McKinney 1975) (practice commentary by A.
Hechtman).
135. This raises an interesting situation. Under Croft, or in a "theft of services"
state, services are capable of being stolen or converted. Could, therefore, employees steal
or convert their own services? This is a difficult question. Perhaps a thirteenth amendment issue would be raised in that instance. See Comment, supra note 5, at 668.
136. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 92. See supra text accompanying note
43.
137. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 978-1004.
138. Comment, supra note 5, at 665 n.20.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
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dude services and labor.14 1 The Seventh Circuit, in Croft, ignored
the centuries of tradition that define the nature of theft and conversion. Broad language may breed endless expansion of relatedsubject
matter. It should not, however, incorporate unrelatedsubject matter.
If the criminal statute is to maintain its status as a mechanism of
public notice, reasonableness cannot be set aside. A union of concepts as foreign as theft (or conversion) and services requires
142

specificity.

CONCLUSION

Theft of employee services is a crime unto itself. It exists by specific statutory enactment in a majority of the states. It is a unique

theft crime because it is not concerned with property interests. Only
services of employees, in which there exists no exclusive property

right, comprise its subject matter. The federal government has no
such "theft of services" criminal statute. Section 641 of the United

States Penal Code is merely a broad recodification of the ordinary
crimes against property.1 43 These crimes cannot exist apart from the

principles of property law.144 The government's employment interest

are nonetheless valuable, and may well require additional legal pro-

tection. Perhaps it is time for the federal government to follow the
states and specifically amend its Penal Code. However, until a "theft

141. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 24, at 633-34. At present, 33 states
plus the District of Columbia have revised their penal codes to specifically create a theft
of services crime. The following states have not done so: Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
142. Just as the term "property," or "thing of value," may be broad enough to
embrace all property rights, the term "services" is itself a consolidation of related
interests:
'Service' is defined broadly ... to include almost anything that is ordinarily
provided for compensation but that was traditionally excluded from theft because it is not classified as 'property.' Thus, in addition to the services previously protected, such as the provision of food, lodging, entertainment, or transportation, communications, and public utilities, the definition includes the
provision of labor and professional services and the rental of property.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04 (Vernon 1974) (practice commentary by S. Searcy III
and J. Patterson) (discussing the effects of recodifying Texas theft code sections concerning services). See also W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 78.
143. See supra notes 51 & 57 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.

of services" statute is enacted, the federal courts should reject the
Croft decision and limit section 641 to the ordinary scope of common-law theft.
RALPH
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